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Preface
Government officials and representatives of aid agencies are continually making decisions about how to spendtheir resources. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that each decision to be made represents a fork in the road,and each investment is a step in the direction of a future that will bring a healthy, sustainably produced diet to
more people—or to fewer.
This report shows just how, and how much, certain policy decisions and social changes will affect the world’s
future food security. It projects the likely food situation in 2020 if the world continues on more or less its present
course, and it then shows how alternative choices could produce a different future. Even rather small changes in agri-
cultural and development policies and investments, it turns out, can have wide-reaching effects on the number of poor
and undernourished people around the world. A world of less poverty, greater food security, and a healthier environ-
ment is possible, but it will not come about without explicit policy steps in that direction.
2020 Global Food Outlook is the latest in a series of world food projections based on a model developed at IFPRI
beginning in 1992.The model has been updated and expanded periodically since then as a way of painting an ever-
clearer picture of the global food situation in 2020. More details about the simulations in this report are available in a
comprehensive monograph titled Global Food Projections to 2020: Emerging Trends and Alternative Futures.
Our thanks go to Rajul Pandya-Lorch for her intellectual support and editorial guidance during the preparation of
this report and to Heidi Fritschel for editorial assistance.

The experience of the 1990s shows that using
short-term trends in global markets to make judgments
about long-term food security is next to useless. Indeed,
year-to-year changes in prices and production—and the
influence that these changes have on the attention
devoted to the global food situation—may contribute to
long-term food problems by encouraging complacency
during periods of strong harvests.To understand the
future of food supply and demand and food security, it is
essential instead to focus on long-term forces, such as
income growth, population growth, and technological
change in agriculture driven by investments in agricul-
tural research, irrigation, and roads.
Throughout recent short-term changes in markets,
the long-term forces have consistently pointed to 
clear causes for concern.The world’s population is
expected to grow from 6 billion people in 2000 to 7.5
billion people in 2020.Availability of land for farming is
on the decline, and water for agriculture and other 
uses is increasingly scarce.Together these and other
forces will challenge the capacity of the world’s food
production system.
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Concern about the world’s future food security seems to run in cycles. In the mid-1990s world cerealprices rose dramatically as cereal stocks fell sharply, and some observers foresaw a starving 21st century
world unable to meet growing food demands from a deteriorating natural resource base.Worries eased in the
late 1990s as global cereal production hit record levels in response to high prices and falling stocks, while
declining incomes due to the East Asian economic crisis reduced the demand for food commodities. As cereal
prices plummeted in response, the policy focus in much of the world shifted from concern over long-term 
food supply and demand problems to concerns about subsidy provision to financially distressed farmers.
Introduction
IMPACT:A Model of the World’s Food 
We projected world food supply and demand, trade, prices, and food security to the year 2020 based on an
updated version of IFPRI’s International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT). IMPACT covers 36 countries or country groups and 16 commodities, including all cereals,
soybeans, roots and tubers, meats, and dairy products (accounting for virtually all of the world’s food and
feed production and consumption).The model is specified as a set of country-level demand and supply equa-
tions linked to the rest of the world through trade. Food demand is a function of commodity prices, per
capita income, and population growth. It includes fresh and processed food. Feed demand is a function of
livestock production, feed prices, and feeding efficiency. Crop production is determined by the area and yield
response functions.Area is projected as a function of crop price, investment in irrigation, and estimated rates
of loss of land to urbanization and land degradation. Crop yield is a function of crop price, input prices,
investments in irrigation, and yield growth due to technological change. Growth in productivity due to tech-
nological change is in turn estimated by its component sources including advances in management research
and, in the case of food crops, plant-breeding research. Other sources of growth considered in the model
include private-sector investments in agricultural research and development, agricultural extension and
education, markets, infrastructure, and irrigation.
1
The world has experienced an unprecedented increase in population during the past century, with a billionpeople added every decade during the last three decades alone. Dramatic shifts in production and
consumption of food have accompanied this population explosion, including a surge in grain production, a spec-
tacular rise in meat production and consumption, and the emergence of an increasingly vital role for interna-
tional trade (Figure 1). High-yielding varieties of wheat and rice swept across much of Asia during the 1970s and
early 1980s, easing fears of imminent famine. Cereal yields have risen more modestly in recent years, but they
have still outstripped gains in other crops such as cassava, potatoes, and beans.
Recent Trends in Food Supply and Demand
Cereal grain production kept pace with rising popu-
lations in some nations, such as India. Many other coun-
tries turned increasingly to imports to feed their
people, either because domestic production was too
low or because income rose far faster than population,
escalating demand for food and feed grain.Argentina,
Australia, Europe, and North America responded with 
a flood of exports.The volume of cereals traded inter-
nationally more than doubled over 30 years to more
than 250 million tons by the late 1990s. During part of
this period, particularly in the early 1980s, government
subsidies to farmers helped fuel cereal production in
Western Europe and North America. Such subsidies led
to a glut of grain, driving down food prices on world
markets and leading to the emergence 
of Western Europe as a significant net
exporter of grain. In the late 1980s and
the 1990s, however, North America and
Western Europe partially reduced subsi-
dies (and revised the form of subsidy 
to less directly influence production 
decisions), and growth in production of
cereals slowed.
Livestock consumed a growing share
of cereal production. Rising incomes in
many parts of the developing world fueled
a boom in meat consumption, particularly
of poultry. Starting from very low levels,
per capita consumption of meat in the
developing world more than doubled
from 1967 to 1997, with even more spec-
tacular increases in the consumption of
poultry. Nevertheless, a typical person in
the developing world still consumes only
a third as much meat, on average, as a
typical person in the developed world.
Defying consistent predictions to the
contrary, both India and China have
managed to satisfy the bulk of their own
cereal market demands—though in the
case of India, this situation has been due
in large part to slow income growth and
policies that raised food prices and
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Figure 1  Population and global food production indices, 1966–1998
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Figure 2  Malnourished children under age 5, 1970–1997
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West Asia/North Africa Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia
South Asia
SOURCE: 1970–1995, L. Smith and L. Haddad, Overcoming Child Malnutrition in 
Developing Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices, 2020 Vision Discussion 
Paper 30 (Washington, D.C., IFPRI, 2000); 1996–1997, IFPRI IMPACT 
extrapolations.
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depressed food demand.Worldwide, prices for maize,
rice, and wheat have each declined by 50 percent or
more over the last 20 years, and consequently food has
been available to satisfy the market demand for these
commodities. Meeting demand, however, does not neces-
sarily mean assuring food security.When people lack the
money to buy this food, their needs are not translated
into market demand.
Food insecurity remains persistent but not neces-
sarily because of shortfalls in global food production.
Significant improvements have been made—the propor-
tion of children under the age of five who suffer from
malnutrition fell sharply from 45 percent in the late
1960s to 31 percent in the late 1990s. However, because
of population growth, the absolute number of malnour-
ished children has fallen much less sharply, from 187
million to 167 million children during this period. East
Asia has led the way in tackling child malnutrition, while
progress has been difficult to sustain in South Asia, which
significantly lowered the number of malnourished chil-
dren during the 1970s but experienced an upturn during
the first half of the 1980s (Figure 2).The situation is
bleakest in Sub-Saharan Africa, the only region in which
both the number and proportion of malnourished chil-
dren has been consistently rising in recent years. In a
world that has experienced astounding advances in
knowledge and growth during the past century, one-
third of all children in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to go
to bed hungry and have their mental and physical devel-
opment compromised by the ravages of hunger.
Will hunger persist for tens of millions of children for the foreseeable future? Will the Earth’s naturalresource base be able to keep up with food demand from a steadily rising world population? The base-
line scenario described here gives our best estimate of the most likely world food situation in 2020 if govern-
ments make no major changes in their agricultural and economic policies and investments and if population
grows at the rate given in the United Nations’ medium projection.This scenario suggests that although overall
global food security may improve somewhat in the next two decades, millions of children will remain hungry
and in some regions food insecurity will be dire.
The World to 2020: Baseline Scenario
Although developing countries will
account for most of the increase in global
demand for cereals, growth in their
demand for cereals is not as rapid as it
once was.As population growth slows and
people in developing countries diversify
their diets away from cereals because of
rising prosperity and changing dietary
preferences, growth in cereal demand in
the developing world is projected to
decline from 2.3 percent a year in
1974–97 to 1.3 percent a year in
1997–2020. Nevertheless, the absolute
increase in the demand for cereals during
1997–2020 is expected to be as large as
the increase in demand during the
preceding 23 years (Figure 3). Developing
countries in Asia, because of their larger
and more urbanized populations and rapid
economic growth, will account for half of
the increase in global demand for cereals,
with China alone accounting for one-
quarter (Figure 4).
The world’s appetite for meat will
jump enormously.Worldwide, demand for
meat is forecast to rise by more than 55
percent (Figure 5) between 1997 and 2020,
with most of the increase occurring in
developing countries. China alone will
account for more than 40 percent of this
increase, compared with India’s 4 percent.
Even though demand for meat will double
in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, per capita consumption of
meat will remain far below levels in the
developed world.This gap suggests that
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Figure 3  World demand for cereals, 1974, 1997, and 2020 
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) for 
1974 data.
Figure 4  Regional shares of increased cereal demand, 1997–2020 
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
Total Increase: 654 million metric tons.
20
20
 G
LO
B
A
L 
FO
O
D
 O
U
T
LO
O
K
 
4
20
20
 G
LO
B
A
L 
FO
O
D
 O
U
T
LO
O
K
 
5
people in these regions will have the
potential to consume considerably 
more meat.
Poultry will account for 40 percent 
of the global increase in demand for meat
to 2020, far higher than the 28 percent 
it accounted for in 1997, reflecting a 
dramatic shift in taste from red meat to
chicken (Figure 6).To fuel the explosive
rise in demand for meat, farmers will
increasingly need to grow cereal crops—
particularly maize—for animal feed 
rather than for direct human consump-
tion (Figure 7).
People in developing countries will
also increase their demand for other
staple food commodities. In many parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, roots and tubers,
especially cassava, sweet potatoes, and
yams, are a major source of sustenance.
In the late 1990s, they accounted for 20
percent of calories consumed in the
region, and even more in the diets of the
poor. In much of Asia and Latin America,
roots and tubers are an important supple-
mental source of carbohydrates, vitamins,
and amino acids in food systems domi-
nated by other commodities. Between
1997 and 2020 total demand for roots
and tubers in the developing world will
increase by 55 percent (248 million tons).
Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to
account for 43 percent of this increased
demand, indicating that roots and tubers
will continue to play a large role in
people’s diets there (Figure 8). Asia will
also account for a significant amount 
of the total increase, with East Asia
accounting for 21 percent and South 
Asia 14 percent.
Even though growth in cereal demand
is slowing, farmers in developing countries
will not be able to keep pace. In most of
the developing world, expansion of crop
area will be severely limited. In parts of
Asia, almost all the suitable land is already
under cultivation, cities are encroaching
on prime agricultural land, and land degra-
dation is becoming an increasingly serious
problem. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America have more potential for area
expansion. Farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 5  World demand for meat, 1974, 1997, and 2020 
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) for 
1974 data.
Figure 6  Types of meat demanded globally, 1997, and increase, 1997–2020
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
Total meat demand increase: 119 million metric tons.
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Increase in meat demand, 1997–2020
   
are projected to bring another 20 million
hectares of cereal production under the
plow between 1997 and 2020, and
farmers in Latin America, 8 million
hectares, but the rest of the developing
world will account for only another 13
million hectares.
Because new agricultural land will be
scarce, increasing cereal production will
require increasing productivity—that is,
getting greater cereal yields from a given
hectare of land. But increases in yields are
slowing for all cereals and in nearly all
regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa yields are
projected to recover from past stagnation
(Figure 9). But yield growth rates in most
of the world have been slowing since the
early 1980s. In the developed world the
slowdown was primarily a result of policy
measures, as North American and
European governments drew down cereal
stocks and scaled back farm-price support
programs in favor of direct payments to
farmers. In Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union economic collapse and
subsequent economic reforms further
depressed productivity. In developing
countries, particularly in Asia, the slow-
down in cereal productivity growth
stemmed partly from growing water
shortages, slowing public investment in
crop research and irrigation infrastruc-
ture, and heavy use of fertilizers, water,
and other inputs (which means that it
takes ever more inputs to sustain yield
gains).These forces are expected to
further slow growth in cereal yields
worldwide from 1.6 percent a year in
1982–97 to 1.0 percent a year in
1997–2020.
Greater yields will also be needed to
increase production of roots and tubers
throughout the developing world, and the
area planted to roots and tubers will actu-
ally shrink significantly in the developed
world. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however,
expansion of cultivated area will account
for a projected 27 percent of additional
roots and tubers production there.
By 2020, with developing countries
unable to fully meet their cereal demands
from their own production, international
Figure 7 Uses of cereal demanded by developing countries, 1997 and 2020
Total cereal demand: 1,118 million metric tons.
1997
Food
67%
Other
12%
Feed
21%
Food
62%
Other
12%
Feed
26%
SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
Total cereal demand: 1.674 million metric tons.
2020
Figure 8  Regional shares of increased roots and tubers demand, 1997–2020
SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
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trade will play a larger role in providing
food to many regions of the globe.
Fortunately, cereal producers in the
Americas and in Europe appear ready and
able to meet this demand.The United
States will become an even more domi-
nant force in agricultural markets, while
Europe will continue to be a major agri-
cultural exporter (Figure 10). Net cereal
imports by developing countries will more
than double to 2020 with Asian nations,
particularly China, boosting their imports
enormously. However, countries that
falter economically, leaving them unable to
muster enough foreign exchange to pay
for adequate food imports, will become
increasingly vulnerable to food shortages.
Sharp falls in food prices over the last
two decades were a great benefit to the
poor, who spend a large share of their
income on food. But international cereal
prices are projected to decline only
slightly during the next two decades, a
significant break from past trends (Figure
11). Shocks to agriculture, particularly
failure to meet farmers’ needs for water
and other inputs, could push food prices
up significantly.
Unfortunately, the prospects for
reducing child malnutrition are mixed.
Overall, the number of malnourished chil-
dren is expected to continue its gradual
decrease, from 166 million in 1997 to 132
million in 2020 (Figure 12).The number of
China’s malnourished children will fall by
half, while India will experience slower
improvement and will remain home to a
third of all malnourished children in the
developing world. Sub-Saharan Africa, with
its combination of high population growth
and lagging economic performance, will be
caught in an increasingly perilous situa-
tion.The number of malnourished chil-
dren there is forecast to increase by 6
million, or 18 percent, compared with
1997. Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to
remain a “hot spot” of hunger and malnu-
trition for years to come.
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Figure 9  Cereal yield growth rates by region, 1967–2020
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Figure 10  Net trade in cereals by region, 1997 and 2020
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Figure 11  Cereal prices by crop, 1997 and 2020 
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Figure 12  Malnourished children by region, 1997 and 2020
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SOURCES: Fig.9: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) 
for historical data. Fig.10: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001. Fig.11: IFPRI IMPACT 
projections, June, 2001. Fig.12: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001.
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Alternative Futures 
Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Troubled Region 
In projections of the future, Sub-Saharan Africa’s problems
stand out in stark and troubling fashion.As already noted,
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in which the number
and percentage of children who are malnourished is
expected to rise, rather than fall, over the next 20 years.
Most disturbing, however, is that even this baseline projec-
tion rests on assumptions that may prove optimistic. One
key assumption is that production of most crops will
increase at healthy rates over the next two decades.African
farmers have, in fact, increased production at even more
rapid rates during the past decade.They have done so
mainly by cultivating more land and not, for the most part,
by using more fertilizer, better practices, or improved vari-
eties of crops.As a result, although crop yields in Sub-
Saharan Africa were nearly equal to those in South Asia in
the 1960s, they are now far lower, and the gap is even
greater between Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing
regions (Figure 13).
Future increases will have to come increasingly from
more intensive production on existing agricultural land.
More intensive agricultural production will have to be
accompanied by measures to maintain and replenish the
soil to prevent agricultural areas from becoming degraded
and better rural infrastructure to allow increased produc-
tion to reach consumers in larger towns and cities.All of
this will require more enlightened policies and substantial
investment in agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and irri-
gation, as well as in roads, clean water, and education.
What if such efforts falter? What if, perhaps because
of political turmoil or the toll exacted by
the AIDS epidemic or simple lack of polit-
ical will to make needed investments and
policy reforms, the projected increases in
both crop area and yields were cut in half
and social indicators such as female life
expectancy and access to education and
sanitation fell significantly? The results
under such a scenario would be tragic.
Because agriculture is such an important
part of the region’s economy, per capita
income would fall, instead of rising slightly
as in the baseline projection. Sub-Saharan
Africa’s net food import bill in 2020
would jump from US$6.5 billion in the
baseline to US$11 billion. Per capita
calorie consumption would decline by 11
percent compared with the 2020 baseline
level, and the blow would fall with
greatest impact on children.The number
of malnourished children would increase
to 49 million, a 50 percent increase over
the level in 1997 (Figure 14).To make
matters worse, such high levels of food
imports may be economically and politi-
cally unsustainable. If African nations lack
the foreign exchange to pay for these
imports, food shortages and malnutrition
would be even more catastrophic.
What kinds of transformations—in
economic and agricultural growth, educa-
tion, and health—will be necessary to
allow Sub-Saharan Africa to battle child-
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Figure 13  Cereal yields by region, 1967, 1997, and 2020
Ea
st
 A
si
a
So
ut
he
as
t 
A
si
a
Su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n 
A
fr
ic
aLa
ti
n 
A
m
er
ic
a
So
ut
h 
A
si
a
SOURCES: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) for 
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W
es
t A
si
a/
N
or
th
 A
fr
ic
a
1967
1997
2020
T
ho
us
an
ds
 o
f k
ilo
gr
am
s 
pe
r 
he
ct
ar
e
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
M
ill
io
ns
 
22
Figure 14  Malnourished children in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1997 and 2020 
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
2020
Baseline 
Scenario
2020
Pessimistic 
Scenario
2020
Optimistic
Scenario
49
39
33
20
20
 G
LO
B
A
L 
FO
O
D
 O
U
T
LO
O
K
 
8
20
20
 G
LO
B
A
L 
FO
O
D
 O
U
T
LO
O
K
 
9
hood malnutrition as effectively as the rest of the devel-
oping world is projected to do? Reversing the tide in
Sub-Saharan Africa enough to reduce the number of
malnourished children in 2020 by one-third, from 33 to
22 million, would require an increase in total investments
on roads, irrigation, clean water, education, and agricul-
tural research of US$76 billion, to US$183 billion,
between 1997 and 2020 compared with the baseline.
Crop yields would have to grow at an annual rate of
around 3 percent. Even more significantly, total gross
domestic product (GDP) would have to grow at an
annual rate of 8 to 10 percent.
Such rates of growth, while spectacular, are not
unprecedented.They occurred in Asia during the Green
Revolution. It is unlikely, however, that Sub-Saharan
Africa will follow the same path as Asia toward rapid
agricultural growth, because Sub-Saharan Africa faces
different constraints. Agroclimatic constraints to
production are more difficult than in much of Asia, the
cost of exploiting water is higher, and transportation
and communications infrastructure is far more limited
than it was when the Green Revolution began in Asia.
Still, the costs of not making the necessary investments
in Sub-Saharan Africa will be tremendous, not only to
the region but also to the rest of the world. Sub-
Saharan Africa is one of the last two bastions of hunger
and malnutrition (South Asia is the other), and without
progress here, the world will make only a small dent in
the global burden of malnutrition.
Asian Giants Not Likely to 
Disrupt World Food Markets
It is often suggested that India and China, home to more
than a third of the globe’s people, hold the fate of global
food security in their hands. Shifts in food production or
consumer behavior in these countries, it is alleged, could
produce enormous shifts in demand for food on global
markets, with effects reverberating throughout the world.
What would happen, for instance, if rapid growth in
incomes caused Indians to consume more meat, as
income growth has done in other parts of the world? A
simulation of these events, however, proves surprisingly
reassuring. If, for instance, the average Indian responded
to growing prosperity by eating more meat, per capita
meat consumption in India could reach 18 kilograms in
2020, similar to levels in Indonesia and Pakistan and more
than twice the projections for India in the baseline
scenario. Consumption of meat in China has grown at
similar rates during the past decade.This meteoric rise in
meat consumption, from very low levels, would place
enormous demands on Indian agriculture and might, in
fact, prove self-limiting. Rising demand for meat would
have to be met both by increased domestic production
and by expanded imports of meat.The demand for cereal
for livestock feed would put additional pressure on both
domestic cereal production and cereal imports. Meat
imports in 2020 would rise to 1.8 million metric tons
(compared with 0.2 million metric tons in the baseline),
and cereal imports to 26 million metric tons instead of 6
million metric tons in the baseline.
The surprising aspect of this scenario, however, is
how little it would affect international prices for cereals
or meat. International food markets appear resilient
enough to accommodate India’s increasing demands.
Under this scenario, beef prices on international markets
would decline only by 2 percent between 1997 and 2020,
rather than by 4 percent in the baseline scenario; wheat
prices would decline by 3 percent, rather than by 8
percent; and maize prices would rise by 5 percent,
instead of falling by 1 percent.
But other vulnerabilities also exist in India and the
other Asian giant, China. Some observers believe that
both countries will have great difficulty expanding agricul-
tural production further, because of degraded land, water
shortages, and growing competition with cities and
industry for land and water.They believe that environ-
mental degradation, unsustainable groundwater extrac-
tion for irrigation, and slowing agricultural investments
could result in a sharper decline in agricultural growth
than envisioned in the baseline scenario.What would be
the impact on world food markets if yields and cultivated
area in India and China increased only half as rapidly as
expected? Some of the effects of this slowdown in
production would tend to offset each other. Food short-
ages would produce higher prices, bringing on a partial
rebound in food production.The agricultural slowdown
also would depress economic growth and with it demand
for food, particularly meat.
Even so, both India and China would be forced to
turn increasingly to food imports. China’s cereal trade
deficit in 2020 would nearly double from 48 million
metric tons under the baseline scenario to 89 million
metric tons, while India would shift from near self-suffi-
ciency under the baseline scenario to imports of 30
million. India’s small agricultural trade surplus in 1997
would give way to a deficit of US$9.1 billion in 2020,
while China’s agricultural trade deficit would soar to
US$33.5 billion.Yet even rising imports of this magnitude
would not throw international cereal or meat markets
into disarray or provoke devastating price increases.
Wheat and maize prices would be higher by about 9
percent each compared with the 2020 baseline projec-
tion, and rice prices would rise 26 percent.
Slowing agricultural growth in India and China would
leave 2 million more children malnourished in 2020 in
each of these two Asian giants, compared with the base-
line scenario. In addition, this result assumes that China
and India would be willing and able to finance an enor-
mous increase in food imports. Should these countries
resist such a growing dependence on foreign suppliers
and attempt instead to protect and promote domestic
production, domestic food prices could increase dramati-
cally, further worsening child malnutrition.
Easing Population Growth’s 
Burden on Young Children
Ever since Malthus, many have regarded rapid population
growth as one of the great underlying causes of hunger and
environmental destruction.Yet birthrates have been
declining in recent years, pushing estimates of future popu-
lation growth downward. If population grows at rates lower
than projected under the baseline, what would be the
impact on the world food situation? The United Nations’
(UN) low estimate of population growth results in a total
world population of 7 billion people in 2020, rather than
the oft-quoted medium projection of 7.5 billion—the
number used in the baseline scenario. Replacing the UN
medium population growth assumptions with its low popu-
lation growth assumptions in the model shows how slower
population growth is likely to affect food security.
In the low population growth scenario, the number
of malnourished children under the age of five in the
developing world declines dramatically (Table 1). Not
only is the population under five smaller, but per capita
consumption of calories is higher thanks to lower food
prices and higher per capita incomes resulting from
lower population growth. Under this scenario per capita
kilocalorie consumption increases by 88 kilocalories
above baseline levels.The number of malnourished 
children in the developing world is projected to drop by
an additional 29 million, to 102 million malnourished
children in 2020.
While this number is still unacceptably high, a 28
percent decline in child malnourishment is truly remark-
able. It reveals the extent to which high population growth
in impoverished regions adds millions of children to popu-
lations that are already highly food stressed and unable to
cope with the additional burden. South Asia stands out in
this analysis: under the low population growth scenario,
child malnutrition in that region drops 25 percent (16
million children) below baseline 2020 levels. Slower popu-
lation growth does not cure all ills, by any means. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the number of malnourished children
would still increase slightly between 1997 and 2020, from
33 million to 34 million, but the increase would be far less
than projected under the baseline scenario.
Feeding People and 
Feeding Livestock 
The high levels of meat demand in developed countries and
the rapid growth in meat demand in developing countries
have caused concern that diverting cereals to feed livestock
leads to an inadequate cereal supply for direct human
consumption.Would improving feeding efficiencies (the
amount of cereal required to produce a kilogram of edible
meat) or dramatically reducing meat consumption in devel-
oped countries release cereals for human food consump-
tion and significantly raise nutritional status in developing
countries?
From 1967 to 1982, feed ratios were constant: as
meat production increased, demand for feed increased by
a directly proportionate amount. Since then, however,
meat producers have required substantially less feed for
each additional kilogram of meat produced.The reasons
are many.The most important have probably been
Millions of malnourished children
REGION
SOUTH ASIA
SOUTHEAST ASIA
EAST ASIA
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
LATIN AMERICA
WEST ASIA/NORTH AFRICA
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
LOW UN
PROJECTION
47.6
10.3
6.2
33.7
1.5
3.0
102.3
MEDIUM UN
PROJECTION
63.3
14.0
8.5
39.3
2.5
4.0
131.5
DIFFERENCE
15.7
3.7
2.3
5.6
1.0
1.0
29.2
Table 1—Child malnutrition under low and medium population projections, 2020
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
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changes in genetics and in livestock management, including
hormone use. In addition, poultry, which convert feed into
meat more efficiently than livestock, have accounted for
an increasing share of meat production.
Some of these phenomena are declining in impor-
tance. Consumers in Europe and North America are
increasing their demand for lean meat. Leaner animals are
inherently less efficient converters of feed into meat. In
addition, meat production in some developing countries
is shifting rapidly toward commercial enterprises, which
rely more heavily on cereal feed than do backyard or
small-scale producers. Baseline projections for the future,
therefore, assume that demand for feed will match meat
production more closely than it has in recent years.
It is possible, however, that technological changes not
accounted for in the baseline scenario would cause feed
ratios to fall more rapidly, continuing the trend of recent
years. Under such a scenario, meat production would
become cheaper and consumers would eat more of
these meats. In addition, total demand for grain would fall
because animals would eat less feedgrain.The price of
maize, instead of holding steady, would fall by 28 percent
relative to the 2020 baseline scenario.
This shift in grain prices then would set off a cascade
of consequences.As demand for animal feed grows more
slowly, international flows of more affordable grain—
particularly maize—would shift away from countries in
East and Southeast Asia that import large amounts of
animal feed.The grain would flow instead toward South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where these cereals are
mainly eaten by people. Net imports of cereals into Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia would increase by 89 and
81 percent, respectively, compared with the baseline
scenario.The less grain is demanded to feed animals in
East Asia and the Middle East, the more grain is available
for consumers, particularly in Africa and South Asia.
Finally, in a surprising connection between different
corners of the global economy, the change in feed ratios
has an effect on the number of malnourished children.A
reduction of 3 million malnourished children relative to
the baseline scenario is not huge, compared to a global
total of 129 million malnourished children, but it is note-
worthy.The effect is most significant in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the region with the most entrenched difficulties.
Because maize, the most important source of animal
feed, is heavily used for food in Africa, less demand for
animal feed would translate directly into more food avail-
able for people. Under this scenario, there would be 1.6
million fewer malnourished children in Sub-Saharan Africa
in 2020 than under the baseline scenario.
Could a radical drop in per capita meat demand in
developed countries also help reduce malnutrition?
Reduced demand for meat in developed countries would
affect food consumption in developing countries primarily
through prices. Reduced demand for meat will directly
reduce the world price of meat, making meat more
affordable for consumers in developing countries.This
reduced meat demand and drop in meat prices will also
cause a direct reduction in meat production in both
developed and developing countries, which will reduce
the demand for cereals for animal feed. Reduced demand
for feedgrains will in turn cause a drop in prices of
cereals, inducing an increase in food demand for cereals.
A 1999 study using IMPACT explored in detail the
impact of a decline in per capita meat demand in devel-
oped countries by one-half between 1993 and 2020.2
It found that 2020 prices for beef, pork, sheep and goat
meat, and poultry would be 22–31 percent lower than in
the baseline.The effects of reduced meat demand in
developed countries on cereal prices are, however, much
less pronounced. Prices for maize and other coarse
grains—commonly used for feed—would be 11 percent
and 10 percent lower, respectively, in 2020 than in the
baseline scenario. Prices of wheat and rice would only be
5 percent and 1 percent lower, respectively.The effects
on wheat and rice are particularly small because although
these grains are the primary staple cereals in developing
countries, they make up only a small share of animal feed.
Reduced demand for maize and other coarse grains for
livestock feed in developed countries does not translate
into greatly reduced prices for rice and wheat in devel-
oping countries.
With the price changes that stem from cutting per
capita meat consumption by half in developed countries,
each person in the developing world would on average
consume about 13 percent more meat and 1.5 percent
more cereal than under the baseline scenario. Falling
meat production in developing countries would lead to a
decline of 33 million metric tons in feed demand.This
decline would offset the 13 million metric tons increase
in food demand, leading to a slight drop in total demand
for cereals in developing countries compared with the
baseline. Because of lower cereal prices, developing-
country farmers would produce 27 million metric tons
less cereals than under the 2020 baseline, and cereal
imports would increase by 11 million metric tons.
In the end, people in developing countries would
consume only 40 additional calories per capita in 2020 as
a result of reduced meat consumption in developed
countries.The number of malnourished children in devel-
oping countries would decline by 3.6 million children in
2020 and by 1.2 million in Sub Saharan Africa.This
improvement in food security in developing countries is
much smaller than many observers have predicted.
Productivity Growth and Food Prices
As already described, crop yields have been growing ever
more slowly around the world. Many yield gains in
recent decades have resulted from one-time advances,
such as higher crop planting density, multiple harvesting,
introduction of strains with greater fertilizer responsive-
ness, and better management practices. Crop yields may
be approaching their physical limitations in some high-
yield systems, primarily in developed countries, and the
maximum yield potentials of rice and maize have
changed little over the past three decades.
Environmental constraints add a layer of uncertainty to
any prediction regarding future yields of intensively culti-
vated crops. Some of the world’s most productive agri-
cultural areas now suffer environmental repercussions
from intensive use of fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides.
What would happen if a combination of increased
environmental problems and reduced investment in agri-
cultural research caused crop yields to grow more slowly
than in the baseline? Alternatively, what if the world food
situation seized the attention of governments, interna-
tional organizations, and private firms, unlocking
resources for agricultural research and irrigation such
that crop yields increased more rapidly than in the base-
line projection? 
The low-yield scenario assumes that irrigation
does not grow at all and that yield growth rates for
meats, milk, and all crops decline by 50 percent from
the baseline level in the developed world and by 40
percent in the developing world.The high-yield
scenario assumes that irrigated area expands by 1
percent per year over the baseline growth rate and
that yield growth rates rise by 20 percent from the
baseline level in the developed world and by 40 
percent in the developing world.
With slower growth in yields, supplies of food
would be unable to keep pace with population and
income growth at prevailing prices. Food would become
scarce, resulting in sharply higher prices. In the low-yield
scenario, rice would be 46 percent more expensive in
2020, compared with baseline projections, and maize
prices 34 percent higher (Figures 15 and 16).
Conversely, faster growth in yields would produce abun-
dant food and falling prices. Maize prices would fall by
30 percent compared with the baseline, and rice prices
would fall by 47 percent.
Changes in the growth of crop yields
have dramatic effects on international
cereal prices. Rice prices are particularly
sensitive to slower yield growth because
of the high proportion of rice produced in
the developing countries that are most
affected under this scenario. How fast
investments in agricultural research and
infrastructure grow over the next few
decades—and thus how fast crop yields
grow—will fundamentally determine the
price of food for the poor.
Trade Liberalization 
Is Important
Most governments have been unwilling to
turn food production over to the forces of
the free market.They intervene in agricul-
ture in countless ways to promote
domestic food production, to keep
domestic food prices low, or to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers. Many
experts have demanded at least the partial
abolition of these measures, arguing that
they produce inefficiencies that leave most
people worse off. Reducing agricultural
trade distortions has been a major thrust
of recent trade negotiations.
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Figure 15  Rice prices under alternative scenarios, 1997–2020
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
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Figure 16  Maize prices under alternative scenarios, 1997–2020
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SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
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It is possible to simulate many of the effects of
removing all agricultural subsidies and trade barriers, at
least on agricultural production.Although this simulation
does not capture the possible effects of trade liberaliza-
tion on other parts of the economy, such as industry, it
can provide some hints regarding the potential impor-
tance of trade liberalization.
Because most subsidies and trade barriers promote
higher domestic production, full trade liberalization would
generally cause agricultural production to fall somewhat,
especially in the developed world. Full liberalization would
cause moderate increases in world cereal prices above
the projected baseline level in 2020.World rice prices
would increase the most, by 14 percent above the base-
line level in 2020, followed closely by wheat and maize,
with price increases of 8 and 9 percent, respectively. Meat
prices would respond to full trade liberalization with even
sharper price increases above baseline levels in 2020, with
sheep and goat prices rising 19 percent and beef prices
rising 18 percent. Pork and poultry are less affected, with
price increases of 13 percent for both commodities.
More important, trade liberalization would generate
significant net economic benefits.Taking into account the
benefits to producers and consumers and the tax savings
resulting from removals of subsidies, liberalizing trade 
for the 16 commodities included in the model would
generate global benefits of US$35.7 billion in 2020 
(Table 2). Both developed regions and developing regions
benefit, with the former gaining US$14.2 billion and the
latter US$21.5 billion.Although these gains are not large
compared with GDP, in many regions they are significant
compared with the value of agricultural production. In
proportion to their agricultural sectors, the biggest
gainers would be Japan and South Korea (the latter is
included in Other East Asia in the table). But the biggest
absolute gains would be in Sub-Saharan Africa, at US$4.4
billion, or 10 percent of the value of production of the
commodities examined here.This gain arises partly
because African farmers face less competition from subsi-
dized exports from Europe and other developed coun-
tries. It also, however, results from the removal of taxes
that most African governments impose on food produc-
tion and consumption.These taxes tend to discourage
investment by farmers and make food more expensive
for consumers.
This simulation captures only a portion of the poten-
tial effects of trade liberalization. If removing trade
barriers stimulated overall economic growth by boosting
industrial production, it would also have large effects on
agriculture and food consumption.
Policy Choices Make a Big Difference 
Most people, if given a moment to think about it, probably
could assemble a reasonable list of the factors that deter-
mine how much food humankind has available to eat. Some
of these forces are not under human control, such as the
REGION/COUNTRY
World
Developed countries
United States
Europe (EU-15)
Japan
Developing countries
Latin America
West Asia/North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
China
Other East Asian countries
India
Other South Asian countries
Southeast Asia
TOTAL
VALUE
(BILLIONS OF US$)
35.7
14.2
4.3
4.2
3.0
21.5
3.0
2.3
4.4
3.6
2.4
2.1
1.3
2.5
SHARE OF VALUE OF
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(%)
3.0
3.0
2.5
3.0
22.3
3.0
2.1
5.9
10.4
1.3
36.7
1.9
3.3
3.5
SHARE 
OF GDP 
(%)
0.07
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.14
0.07
0.13
1.03
0.11
0.18
0.14
0.36
0.15
Table 2—Effects of global trade liberalization on welfare, 2020
SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
GAINS FROM GLOBAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
NOTE: Data represent net welfare effects if trade in the 16 commodities in IMPACT were liberalized.
weather. Many others are, at least to a degree.They include
the speed of population growth, the level of investment in
technologies that allow increased food production, and the
ability of farmers to take advantage of available methods for
growing food.
But how much of a difference do these humanly
controlled factors make? Put another way, how would the
world be different in 2020 as a result of a concentrated
effort to improve the global food situation? How
different would that be from a world in which govern-
ments, civil society, the private sector, and indeed all
stakeholders devoted little attention to such issues?
Compare two alternative futures, an optimistic
scenario characterized by increased attention to key
drivers of food security and a pessimistic scenario char-
acterized by relative neglect of these key drivers. In the
first, economic growth accelerates by 25 percent,
compared with the baseline projection, and population
growth rates decline.The number of people with access
to clean water and the number of women with access
to secondary education both increase by 10 percent.
Depending on the region, agricultural yields increase
between 10 and 20 percent faster than anticipated by
the baseline scenario.The area of irrigated land
increases substantially.
The second alternative foresees a reversal of these
developments. Instead of accelerating, economic growth
slows, while populations grow more rapidly.Access to
clean water and to education declines.Agricultural yields
slow down, and no additional land is irrigated.
Global cereal production in the more optimistic
scenario increases by 5 percent relative to the baseline
scenario, whereas it decreases by 4 percent in the
pessimistic scenario. Moreover, in the first scenario, food
becomes much cheaper. Rice, for instance, falls in price by
44 percent compared with the 2020 baseline projection.
In the pessimistic scenario, by contrast, its price rises by
45 percent.These shifts in food production and prices
reverberate through world food markets. If food produc-
tion should increase substantially,Asian countries would
become less dependent on imports for their food
supplies because they would be able to grow more of
their own food. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand,
would import more, because food would become more
affordable. If food production stagnated, on the other
hand, South Asia’s net imports of food would rise by 90
percent. Sub-Saharan Africa would increasingly become
priced out of world food markets; the region’s consumers
would need just as much food but would not have the
income to buy it.
The most dramatic result of this simulation is also
the most vital for humanity.The two alternatives for the
future show enormous differences in the ability of fami-
lies to feed their children. Under the optimistic
scenario, the number of malnourished children in devel-
oping nations would decline from 166 million in 1997 to
94 million in 2020, well below the 132 million of the
baseline scenario. In China, this number would drop by
80 percent over two decades. Latin America could
virtually eliminate the scourge of malnutrition. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, where childhood malnutrition is now on
the rise, progress would be less dramatic but still
substantial. Instead of increasing, as predicted by base-
line estimates, the number of malnourished children
would decrease by 3 million (Figure 17).The central
causes of this improvement in child malnutrition are
threefold: broad-based and rapid agricultural produc-
tivity and economic growth, reduction in population
growth rates, and increased investment
in education and health. Each factor
accounts for about one-third of the
improvement in childhood malnutrition.
The pessimistic scenario, on the
other hand, depicts a slowly unfolding
catastrophe. Instead of substantial declines
in childhood malnutrition over the next
20 years, the problem would become
worse, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa,
where the number of malnourished chil-
dren would increase from 33 million to 49
million. On a global scale, the developing
countries would be home to 178 million
malnourished children, compared with 94
million in the optimistic scenario.This is
the human price of economic and agricul-
tural failure.
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Figure 17  Malnourished children in 1997 and 2020 under alternative 
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What will it cost to generate the modest levels of agricultural production growth and human welfareimprovement envisioned by the baseline scenario? Investments by developing countries in five key
sectors—irrigation, rural roads, agricultural research, clean water provision, and education—are projected to
total US$579 billion between 1997 and 2020 (Table 3).These investments are certainly feasible.To put them
into context, if total government expenditures in the developing world stayed constant at 1997 levels, the
investments foreseen in the baseline scenario would amount to just 3.6 percent of total government spending
by developing countries from 1997 to 2020.
The Cost of Food Security 
The economic burden represented by these invest-
ments, however, varies significantly from region to region.
South Asia and Latin America will have the highest total
expenditures, at US$148 billion and US$140 billion
respectively. Whereas Latin America’s annual investment
will represent just over 2 percent of its total 1997
government spending, South Asia’s investments will 
represent 11 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment
requirements, totaling US$107 billion between 1997 
and 2020, will represent a sizeable 18.6 percent of 1997
government spending on an annual basis. China will
require investments totaling US$41 billion to achieve
baseline results.
Of the five sectors, irrigation will account for 30
percent of the total investment, with agricultural
research and rural roads accounting for another 21
percent each (Table 4). Education’s share in investment
is the lowest, 13 percent. Rural road construction will be
particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America, where it will represent 35 percent and 26
percent of total investment in the five investment
sectors, respectively, because road construction will 
be required to support relatively rapid area and crop
yield growth in these regions. Even with these relatively
high levels of investment, Sub-Saharan Africa will still
have an extremely underdeveloped transportation
system, and further improvements will remain essential
despite their expense.
Education will represent 27 percent of total invest-
ment expenditures in West Asia and North Africa under
the baseline in large part because of rapid population
growth. Clean water, representing 15 percent of total
REGIONS
Latin America
West Asia/ North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
India
Southeast Asia
China
Developing Countries
BASELINE
140.4
80.5
106.9
148.2
110.5
52.6
41.4
578.9
OPTIMISTIC
179.1
112.3
133.3
198.4
137.8
69.7
83.5
802.4
PESSIMISTIC
75
52
63.9
70.3
54.5
27.1
26.8
322.7
BASELINE
2.2
2.8
18.6
11.1
10.3
4.2
1.5
3.6
OPTIMISTIC
2.9
3.9
23.2
14.9
12.8
5.6
3.0
4.9
PESSIMISTIC
1.2
1.8
11.1
5.3
5.1
2.2
1.0
2.0
Percent 
ANNUAL INVESTMENT AS % OF 1997
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Billions of US$
Table 3— Total projected investments, baseline, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios, 1997–2020 
SOURCE: Government expenditures are from World Bank 2000.
NOTE: In addition, international agricultural research expenditures by the CGIAR centers between 1997 and 2020 are projected to total US$ 9.65
billion for the baseline scenario, US$ 10.37 billion for the optimistic scenario, and US$ 7.53 billion for the pessimistic scenario.
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investment expenditures across the developing world, is
projected to account for 35 percent of China’s expendi-
tures between 1997 and 2020.Agricultural research will
account for particularly large shares of China’s and West
Asia and North Africa’s total investment expenditures at
35 percent and 31 percent, respectively, and relatively
high shares of Southeast Asia’s and Latin America’s total
investment expenditures at 27 percent and 26 percent,
respectively. Public agricultural research will account for
only 7 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total investment
expenditures between 1997 and 2020.
Total investment under the pessimistic scenario
declines to US$323 billion, a decline of 44 percent from
the baseline level (Table 3).This savings comes at the cost
of leaving an additional 46 million children malnourished
in 2020. It is possible—indeed, it is necessary, for the
health of millions of people—to do even better.The
alternative future outlined in the previous section as the
optimistic scenario can be achieved if governments and
the private sector make a concerted effort to finance
significantly larger investments.The optimistic scenario
would require a total investment amounting to a 39
percent increase over baseline projections, or US$802
billion between 1997 and 2020.
In the optimistic scenario, the largest single additional
investment is in irrigation. Spending on irrigation would
almost double compared with the baseline, amounting to
US$343 billion between 1997 and 2020. Spending on
education would increase by 36 percent from the baseline
scenario, with the increases concentrated in Latin America
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Investment in rural roads would
increase by an additional 7 percent, with larger increases
projected in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The most important result of this simulation is
not the exact distribution of the incremental investments
among these different areas. Equally impressive results
can be achieved by investing additional money in roads or
agricultural research, for instance, rather than in irriga-
tion. Indeed, in combating childhood malnutrition, invest-
ments in education and clean water are among the most
important factors, in addition to efforts devoted narrowly
toward increases in agricultural production.
What this simulation shows is that even this opti-
mistic future can be achieved. It illustrates the total
investments required to make significant, even dramatic,
improvements in the world food situation.These invest-
ments represent less than 5 percent of government
expenditures in the developing world over the next 20
years.This relatively modest level of commitment would
increase food security for millions more people than the
business-as-usual baseline scenario.
REGION/COUNTRY
Latin America
West Asia/North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
India
Southeast Asia
China
Developing countries
IRRIGATION
44.8
17.9
28.1
61.3
42.5
18.6
3.2
174.6
RURAL
ROADS
36.7
7.3
37.9
27.4
23.5
3.9
6.8
120.3
EDUCATION
12.1
21.5
15.7
14.5
10.5
6.8
2.4
75.9
CLEAN
WATER
9.8
8.5
17.3
27.0
18.4
9.4
14.4
86.5
NATIONAL
AGRICUL-
TURAL
RESEARCH
37.0
25.3
8.0
18.0
15.6
14.1
14.6
121.7
TOTAL
INVEST-
MENTS
140.4
80.5
106.9
148.2
110.5
52.6
41.4
578.9
Table 4—Investments in food security under the baseline scenario, 1997–2020
SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.
20
20
 G
LO
B
A
L 
FO
O
D
 O
U
T
LO
O
K
 
17
The world’s decision makers face a fork in the road.This report shows some of the key policy and invest-ment decisions that are likely to lead the world in the direction of food security for all and other 
decisions likely to lead to increased poverty and malnutrition. Steps toward a future of global food security will
have enormous payoffs worldwide, offering all people a higher quality of life and greater economic potential. In
contrast, if decision makers fail to reform key policies or make adequate investments—or even if they reduce
policy efforts slightly from those described in the baseline scenario—the costs in terms of human misery and
wasted potential will be enormous.
Conclusion
One theme echoed throughout this report is intense
concern over the future prospects for Sub-Saharan
Africa.The pessimistic scenario described earlier, in fact,
reflects a future that many experts see as the most likely
outcome for Sub-Saharan Africa. Deteriorating natural
resources, stagnant technologies, and rising population
densities are common features of the rural landscape
throughout much of the Sub-Saharan Africa and will be
alleviated only with a major structural transformation
from subsistence agriculture to a commercialized and
highly productive agricultural economy capable of
supporting a growing urban population. Equally important
are investments in social services, such as education and
health, and broad-based economic growth.Without
education and health services, few positive changes are
possible or sustainable.Without economic growth in
rural areas as well as in the towns and cities, those who
want to or are forced to leave subsistence agriculture
will find few opportunities. Sub-Saharan Africa cannot
afford to fall further behind in overcoming threats to the
health and well-being of its children, but its leaders have
shown little sense of urgency and commitment to the
challenge of rural development to date.
Better policies and increased investments—not only
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also throughout the developing
world—can greatly improve food security for millions of
people.The future world will reflect, in profound ways,
the choices made by national governments, nongovern-
mental organizations, and private companies now and in
the coming decades.Those choices will build the world
that we will face in 2020.
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